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GENERAL PLAN EAST CZESLAW MADAJCZYK Polish Western Affairs 1962, Vol. III No 2 The term Generalplan Ost first appears in two documents of the Ministry for the occupied Eastern Territories. (Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete), prepared by Wetzel, an employee in the Racial Policy Office of the N.S.D.A.P.1, who from 1941 simultaneously held an important post in the Political Department of Rosenberg´s ministry. The first document is Wetzel´s minute of the session on questions of the Germanization of the Soviet Baltic republics, held on February 4th , at Dr. Kleist´s2. This minute refers to S.S.-Obersturmbannführer Gummitsch (representative of S.S.Standartenführer Ehlich3) as taking part on behalf of the Security Office of the Reich (R.S.H.A.), on account of his association with the institution from which the Generalplan Ost (hereafter referred to as GPO) by Wetzel, dated April 27th, 1942. It bears the title Stellungnahme und Gedanken zum Generalplan Ost des Reichsführers S.S., and has already been published in several historical periodicals4. Judging from the provenance of the document and its contents, we may be justified in assuming that it was intended for Rosenberg´s use. The skepticism evident in it regarding the actuality of a number of steps proposed by the R.S.H.A. indicates the atmosphere of antagonism that existed between Himmler and Rosenberg at that time regarding their scope of competence in the occupied Soviet territories. Wetzel writes that in November 1941 he had already known that the R.S.H.A., then enjoying the strongest position in the Reich and - in the opinion of the institutions under Himmler - also operating as a Commissariat for Germanization, was worked on a general plan for the eastern territories. A competent employee of that office, Ehlich (mentioned earlier), had then given him the figure of 31 million "aliens" destined for deportation. Certain elements of the Generalplan Ost elaborated by the R.S.H.A. can be singled out in Wetzel´s appraisal, because he often takes them as a starting point for his counter-arguments. He quotes the following estimate of the number of future settlers provided for in the GPO:
Together with settlers from other Gernanic countries and Volksdeutsche, the authors of the GPO expected to have 10 million persons for the colonization of the eastern territories. These territories included the occupied Polish lands, the Soviet Baltic republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), the "West Ukraine" (the provinces of Zhitomir and Kamieniec Podolski, part of Vinnitsa) and areas assigned for settlement: the Leningrad region (Ingermanland), the Crimea and hinterland and the bend of the Dnieper (Dnieprbogen). These territories were populated by about 45 million "aliens" including 5-6 million Jews5. For racial reasons, the authors of the GPO planned to deport 31 million of these people to western Siberia. On the other hand, one may accept the hypothesis that the remaining 14 million people were to be annihilated, or considered suitable for Germanization and left where they were, or else used as manpower to work in the Reich or in the annexed territories. Wetzel also writes that the GPO gave the percentage of Polish and Byelorussian population and that of the "West Ukraine" and the Baltic countries that was to be deported to West Siberia in the course of thirty years. Wetzel, who opposed the resettlement of the population from the Baltic republics, made an exception here and did not quote the percentage. Of the Polish population 80-85% was to be deported, i.e., from 16 to 20l4 million;65% of the population was to be deported from the "West Ukraine" and 75% from Byelorussia. The first information of the provisions of the GPO was probably not that (previously mentioned) given by Ehlich to Wetzel in 1941. Much goes to show that were first mentioned in a speech made by Heydrich, head of the RSHA, in Prague6 on October 2nd , 1941, just after he had taken up the post of Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, where he presented the plans for the future of the Czech nation according to the general principles for the Bohemia. These principles are worthy of close attention. True, the name GPO did not figure in Heydrich´s speech, but the outline of expansion to the east in stages is in striking agreement with many of the elements contained in Wetzel´s appraisal. Polish territory, the Baltic republics and the Ukraine, towards which Heydrich did not clearly define the intentions of the Third Reich, were to fall within it range. In May 1942, Himmler received a memorandum from Professor Konrad Meyer-Hetling, headed Generalplan Ost, Rechtliche, wirtschaftliche und räumliche Grundlagen des Ostaufbaues, which we shall print below. Only the six-page summary of this memorandum under the title Kurze Zusammenfassung der Denkschrift Generalplan Ost - rechtliche, wirtschaftliche und räumliche Grundlagen des Ostaufbaues, among the documents of the Nuremberg Trial (No 2225), was known until recently. It was thought, that the memorandum itself had been lost. The first information of its content was given by Robert L. Koehl in RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939-1945, published by the Harvard University Press in 1957. Further references to it existence were made in 1960 in the West Germany quarterly "Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte"7. The memorandum and its summary were enclosures in the letter sent by SS-Oberführer Professor Meyer-Hetling on May 28th, 1942 to Himmler, Reichsführer SS and Commissary for Germanization. As early as the spring of 1940, Professor Meyer-Hetling was Head of the SS planning office for the Polish territories incorporated into the Reich8. From the following year, he was head of the planning office of the Commissariat for Germanization, the Stabshauptamt, and of the Central Land Office (Zentralbodenamt). He was also Director of the Institute for Agrarian Affairs and Agrarian Policy (Institut für Agrarwesen und Agrarpolitik) at the Berlin University. It was at this university that the published document was prepared. Dr. J. Boesler cooperated in financial questions. Perhaps it was coincidence that in the summer of 1942, that is, shortly after the preparation of the memorandum and it favourable reception by Himmler, Professor Meyer-Hetling was given further powers in the field of planning resettlement. He took up the post of Beauftragter für die Siedlung und Landesraumordnung beim Reichsleiter für Agrarpolitik in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and of Bauernführer of the Reich. He was also appointed Head of the Committee for Resettlement in the occupied eastern territories9. It follows from Professor Meyer-Hetling´s previously mentioned letter of May 28th that the published memorandum was prepared in connection with instructions received on July 115th, 1941, and Meyer´s report of January 27th, 194210. Here is some information concerning these dates. In the spring of 1941, Meyer-Hetling was entrusted with the preparation of a memorandum on planning resettlement and on development planning in the Polish territories "incorporated into the Reich"11. For this purpose he made use of the results of research carried out by the Technical College in Berlin12. He made the results of this research known in a paper he read on July 15th, 1941, and at the opening of an Exhibition Planung und Aufbau im Osten on October 23rd13. Himmler expressed his appreciation of Professor Meyer-Hetling´s elaboration, which included exemplary model villages and farms. On January 27th, 1942, the SS Reichsführer received Professor Meyer and entrusted him with the further task of elaborating the legal, economic and political foundations for the "further reconstruction of the East", also including the Crimea and the Leningrad region. It follows from the evidence given by Meyer at the VIII Nuremberg Trial that the Generalplan Ost elaborated by him had been based on suggestions made by Himmler and the head of the Stabshauptamt Greifelt during conversations. In his letter of May 28th, 1942, to Himmler, Meyer wrote that the Generalplan Ost which he had submitted as well as the directives to this plan and the recommendations of the Reichsführer had called for further research on basic questions, the result of which he was presenting for consideration. In the published memorandum, he recalls that the Generalplan Ost of July 15th, 1941, envisaged the assignment of new areas for resettlement, taking into account the development prospects over a period of 30 years. As can be seen, the term Generalplan Ost is used by Meyer with many meanings. In the letter he uses it rather in the same sense as he did during the VIII Nuremberg Trial. In this sense, it was a plan for resettlement solely of the Polish territories "incorporated into the Reich". In the published document part B. with several tables and graphs, constitutes the continuation of the elaboration of the plan. It deals almost exclusively with calculations of the cost of the resettlement campaign and the sources from which these costs might be covered in the Polish territories "incorporated into the Reich". Detailed considerations is given to the measures essential for the rapid Germanization of these territories, and for the completion of resettlement in the rural areas within five years after the end of the war and in town within ten years. The cheapness of labor is striking in the financial calculations. This results from the planned use of prisoners-of-war and the inmates of prisons as man power. Parts A and C, on the other hand, have the character of a long-term plan, of long-term imperialist expansion, ranging over further Polish territories and Soviet areas under German occupation. As compared with the summary already known to us, it does not introduce any new factors in the basic principles. What is new is the detailed elaboration of these principles. The maximum of control was to be guaranteed to the SS in the colonized territories, by a planned system of ownership and jurisdiction based on the feudal pattern (Zeitlehen - 7 years, Erblehen - 20 years, Leheneigentum, Lehensgericht, Oberlehensgericht), and a State monopoly of land, both in the towns and in the rural areas. They were to cover an area the size of 1-2 districts in the Reich (about 2,000 sq. Km) and to relocated at distances of about 100 km along two communication routes. One was to lead from the Reich in the direction of the Leningrad region (Königsberg-Leningrad, Wilno-Leningrad) and the other, also from the Reich, in the direction of the Crimea (Warsaw-Lublin-Rowne or Cracow-Lwow-Rowyne and then Biala Cerkiew-Krivoi Rog-Nikokajew). A plan was hurriedly prepared for building a motor road from the Reich to the Crimea. Fourteen bases were to be set up in the General Gouvernement, in the Zamosc region among others, 8 in the Ukraine and 14 in the so called Ostland14. Also note worthy is the intention of reducing the population of the towns. In the Leningrad region the population of the towns was to decrease from the pre-war figure of 3,200,000 to 200,000 and in the Crimea, from 790,000 to 680,000. And lastly, a rather curious thing, Professor Meyer-Hetling included 80,000 Polish mountaineers in the reserve population for resettlement. The question arises as to the relation of the document published below to the GPO, the subject of E. Wetzel´s elaboration (Stellungnahme und Gedanken zum Generalplan Ost des Reichsführers SS). The Generalplan Ost of the Central Security Office of the Reich most probably concentrated on the population policy, and on ways and methods of deportation or annihilation of certain European peoples. In these genocidal plans, the questions of deportation, the extent of Germanization among the people woh were to be deported and the resettlement of Germanic peoples were dominant15. In Professor Meyer-Hetling´s GPO, the legal and economic aspects of the Nazi colonization of the occupied Polish and Soviet territories were brought to the fore. Nevertheless, the GPO elaborated by the Central Security Office of the Reich contained estimates of the reserves of population needed for resettlement and a fairly precise determination of the territories assigned for colonization. In the estimate of the population reserves for the purpose of German resettlement in the east, the RSHA gave a figure known to us from Hitler´s statement in the Chief Headquarters on October 18th, 194116. In this situation, Himmler´s instructions to Professor Meyer-Hetling to make further estimates seems to indicate that the SS leader and commissary for Germanization was interested in developing the basic provisions and in checking up on the calculations of the RSHA by an institution outside it apparatus - the Institute of the Berlin University. The hypothesis may be advanced that the Generalplan Ost was a plan prepared by the RSHA, constituting a further development of the plan for the treatment of the conquered territories of the Soviet Union revealed by Hitler on July 16th, 1941 in the General Headquarters17, while, Meyer-Hetling´s GPO was partly an analytical checking of the principles of that plan and partly a development of those principles. Himmler took action very quickly on receiving Meyer´s memorandum and sent his opinion to Greifelt, the Head of the Stabshauptamt, on June 12th. The general commander of the SS and police expressed his approval of Meyer´s plan. He intended to present it to Hitler at an appropriate moment, but considered it essential first to link it up into one whole (Gesamtsiedlungsplan) with earlier plans prepared for the various Polish territories "incorporated into the Reich", for Bohemia and Moravia, for Alsace-Loraine and also for Upper Austria and Lower Styria18. In addition, Himmler demanded that the estimates for the settlers, workmen and financial means, which Meyer had drawn up solely for the Polish territories "incorporated into the Reich", should be extended to cover all the territories included in the GPO, and that the Generalsiedlungsplan prepared on the model of the Generalplan Ost; at the same time he demanded that the period of realization should be shortened from 25-30 years to 20 years. On the other hand, the range of Germanization in the eastern territories as envisaged by Meyer, particularly the limitation of the resettlement campaign in the General Gouvernment and Ostland to restricted bases, met with Himmler´s disapproval. He demanded that the GPO should provide for the complete Germanization of Esthonia, Latvia and the General Government within 20 years. Lithuania was to be colonized.
References to Meyer´s memorandum can be found in Himmler´s speech to the leaders of the SS and the police at Zhitomir in the southern Russian sector on September 16th, 194219. He then gave an assurance to his subordinates that the Reich would be victorious in the following year and announced - as in his correspondence with Meyer - that all the Polish territories would be colonized and that the Soviet Baltic countries and Byelorussia (Ostland), the Crimea and the Leningrad region would be Germanized and colonized. Himmler made another announcement of something new in his speech, namely, that resettlement bases (as proposed in the document published by Meyer on the General Gouvernment and part of the occupied Soviet territories) were to be established in the eastern areas as far as the Don and Volga and even perhaps as the Urals. On January 12th, 1943, Himmler sent a letter direct to Meyer concerning the eastern plan20. In this letter, the chief of the SS expressed his opinion on the table of basic figures (Grundzahlen) and the maps prepared by Meyer for the Generalsiedlungsplan21 which had been sent to him by Greifelt on December 23rd, 1942. In turn, he demanded that, besides Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, the Leningrad region, the Crimea and the Chersonese, resettlement in the east should also include Byelorussia. The GPO was to be amended also these lines without delay. Copies of the letter of December 23rd, 1942, to Meyer were sent to SS-Obergruppenführer Wolff, chief of the SS personal staff, to SS-Gruppenführer Berger, head of the Chief Command Office of the SS, who from 1942 also carried out the function of liaison officer between the Ministry for the East and the institutions under the Reichsführer SS, and to the chief of the police and the security service. Meyer-Hetling answered the letter of the Chief of the SS22 after a month (February 15th), giving an assurance that he was prepared the basic materials for the Generalsiedlungsplan and enclosing some tables, which have not so far been found. In the face of the declaration of total war after the defeat at Stalingrad, Meyer-Hetling asked, without any great enthusiasm, if he was to continue to elaborate basic materials for the Generalsiedlungsplan. According to information given in the "Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte", it was only in April that Himmler gave a rather evasive reply23. It is probable that planning of the colonization in the east was soon abandoned, for Hitler, in connection with the declaration of total war, suspended all further planning until peacetime. One sometimes meets with the opinion that the GPO was only fantasy, an extravagance, a utopia that brought no practical consequences24. This view should be confronted with the already known facts and measures taken by the authorities of the Third Reich, particularly Himmler and his apparatus, which in the years 1941/42 gained an unquestionably key position in the eastern policy. The moves made to facilitate the realization of the GPO and all the initial measures for it realization are also important. The period of military successes in the east was too short to achieve anything more. The period of work on the GPO coincided with the greatest intensification of Nazi crimes in the east. This applies, above all, to the mass "liquidation" of millions of Soviet prisoners-of-war and Jews. The data contained in the version of the GPO available to Wetzel had become obsolete. According to these data, 45 million persons were living in the territories assigned for colonization, including 5-6 million Jews. A large percentage of this population perished; the losses in Poland reached six million and in the territory of the USSR over 20 million, including about seven million civilians. Moreover, at least one and a half million Polish civilians and prisoners-of-war ware taken to the Reich for forced labor. And the Nazis intended to act even more ruthlessly after achieving victory. In November 1941, that is at the time when Hitler and his close associates considered that the result of the war was already decided, Göring gave some indications of this in a conversation with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister. During this conversation the question of the famine threatened Greece war raised. Göring advised Ciano not to worry about this too much, just as he was not worrying about the fact that the Soviet prisoners-of-war were dying of hunger. "This year, 20 to 30 million people will die of hunger in Russia. Perhaps it is a good thing that this is happening, because certain peoples must be decimated"25. It should also be borne in mind that the colonization of the annexed Polish territories and the Germanization of Silesia and Pomerania, by means of the general or very large-scale imposition of citizenship of the Third Reich upon Poles, were far advanced and progressing at a terrific pace, but the results were superficial and miscarried. In the Poznan and Lodz regions there were two chief resettlement staff headquarters and 17 district resettlement staff headquarters operating in August 1942. Pomerania, Silesia and the Polish lands incorporated into East Prussia had each one chief resettlement staff headquarters, with a total of 34 district staff headquarters (Pomerania 18, Silesia 7, East Prussia 9). Altogether, they deported about one million Polish citizens, at the same time resettling about three quarters of a million Germans from the Reich and Volksdeutsche of various kinds At Riga, there was a chief resettlement staff headquarters for the Soviet Baltic republic; a resettlement staff headquarter was also set up at Kowno as well as ten district statt headquarters. A resettlement staff headquarters was also set up in Prague.26 In January 1942, Himmler came forward with the project of creating an area of German resettlement under his auspices in the south-western part of the occupied Lithuanian Republic, to which the Lithuanian Volksdeutsche who hat not yet been resettled were to return. As is known, "West Lithuania" was an area assigned for colonization in the plan evaluated by Wetzel. True, up to December 1942, Rosenberg was opposed to Himmler´s project; nevertheless, by autumn 1942, the SS authorities had expropriated 6,597 farms in Lithuania and had resettled on farms 16,786 persons27 who had been repatriated to the Reich in the years 1939/40. In March, 1942, while in Cracow, Himmler set himself the aim of starting the colonization of the Polish territories included in the General Gouvenment, territories which Hitler, in a conversation with Governor Frank in March 1941, had destined for Germanization within 15 to 20 years28. The head of SS and police designated the south-eastern part of the Lublin province, known as the Zamosc region, as the first area for colonization. Over 100,000 Poles were expelled from the Zamosc region between November 1942 and July 194329. A little earlier, in the second half of 1942, it was decided to create a resettlement area in the Zhitomir-Vinnitsa area which was to receive Volksdeutsche from the Ukrainie, who were threatened by the partisans. At this time steps were also made taken to prepare the Crimea to receive Germans repatriated from Italian Tyrol and Palestine after the war30. Among others, the SS-Krimkommando was set up. Finally, preparations were being made for the resettlement in the east of people from Holland and undesirable population from Alsace-Lorraine, Luxembourg and Slovenia. These were preliminary steps towards colonization in the east, sometimes intended to sound the reaction of the population of some particular territory. These measures included the deportation of "aliens", the settlement of Germanic population and the concentration of Volksdeutsche in the occupied eastern territories. It is a striking fact that all the territories where these attempts at various kinds of colonization ware made were those included in the territorial range of the GPO elaborated by the RSAH. And yet another argument. The year 1942 spelled failure for the Nazi leaders who did not prove ruthless enough in realizing the expansionist aims of National Socialism. Governor Frank suffered a defeat in the disputes on the extent of competence of the SS and police in the General Gouvernment; his suggestion that the Germanization of this area should be started after the war was rejected in 1942. A. Dallin, in his German Rule in Russia 1941-1945, pointed out how quickly the proposals for the dismemberment of the USSR put forward by Rosenberg, the minister for the occupied eastern territories, were quashed and how powerful was the position of the head of the SS, and police in the occupied territories of the USSR. Earlier in autumn 1941, the cautious Neurath had been replaced by none other than Heydrich, head of the Chief Security Office of the Reich, who became head of the Bohemian Protectorate. This, and the fact that Himmler, in preparing the GPO, was realizing Hitler´s directives and suggestions to treat the east as Lebensraum (which Hitler expressed clearly in conversations known to have taken place at the General Headquarters)31, show all the more clearly that the threat of these criminal projects being put into practice in the east was a very serious one. This threat could only be averted by a Nazi defeat; and paradoxically, the armies of the nations whose population was to be sent to distant Siberia entered Berlin in 1945. We received the microfilm of this document from the Microfilm Copies of Miscellaneous German Records Collection (Part II), National Archives Microcopies No. T - 84 (Part II), roll 73, item E.A.P. 66-c-12-2/20. We are publishing the whole text, leaving the conventional abbreviations: ca (circa), evtl. (eventuell), z.Z. (zur Zeit), z.B. (zum Beispiel), verg or vgl. (Vergleiche), d.h. (das heisst), usw (und so weiter), S. (Seite), We have also left the original notes marked on the document. NOTES 1 In October 1939, this Nazi expert on racial questions prepared a menorandum jointly with Dr. Hecht on the treatment of the Polish population. 2 On March 11th, 1942, this protocol was received by Dr. Otto Bräutigam, head of the Eastern Political Department. Kleist was head of the Ostland Section in the same Political Department. 3 Dr. Hans Ehlich was head of the III B group (questions of re-Germanization, questions of ethical groups in south-eastern territories, population policy, etc.). 4 "Przeglad Zachodni" No 2/1958, "Voienno istoricheskiy Journal" No 1/1960, "Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte" No 3/1958. 5 Wetzel estimated this population at 65 million, but he probably did not allow for those who had been evacuated into the interior of the USSR. 6 In the documentary publications Die Vergangenheit warnt, Prague, 1960, p. 126 7 Nachtrag zu der Dokumentation "Generalplan Ost", Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, No 1/1960 8 As early as January 24th, 1940, during a meeting with Koppe, the chief of the SS and police in Poznan, he made a speech to those engaged in planning German colonization in the annexed Polish territories (National Archives Microcopy No T-81, roll No 296 k. 2421159/2421160). The activity of Meyer-Hetling as chief of planning in Poznan was referred to by his collaborator von Machui in the book Die Hintergründe des Falles Oberländer written under pseudonym of Victor Silling (pp. 45-51), published in 1960. 9 Buchheim; Rechtsstellung und Organisation des Reichskommissars für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums. The collective work, Gutachten des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, München 1958. 10 Nuernberg, Trial, No VIII, vol. 8, stenogram of evidence given by Professor Meyer Hetling. 11 In October 1939, the Nazi Reich annexed Gdansk, Pomerania, the Poznan region, most of the province of Lodz, Upper Silesia, the Dabrowa Basin, the western part of the provinces of Crakow, the Ciechanow and Suwalki regions ("territories incorporated into the Reich"). These territories had nearly ten million inhabitants, are formed into the General Gouvernment by Nazi authorities. The head of the occupied authorities in the GG was Dr. Hans Frank. 12 See the remarks of Helmut Heiber to the documentation on the Generalplan Ost, "Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte" No 3/1958 13 The materials shown at this exhibition included the publication Planung und Aufbau im Osten (Erläuterungen und Skizzen zum ländlichen Aufbau in den neuen Ostgebieten) prepared by the Stabshauptamt Planning Department and edited by K. Meyer, author of the introduction. It appeared in Berlin in 1942. 14 "Ostland" included the Byelorussian Republic and the Soviet Baltic republics. 15 The population to be resettled did not include only Germans and Volksdeutsche, but also other nationalities of Germanic origin. 16 Bericht No 45 of 18 Oct. 1941, photocopy, Archives of the Chief Commission for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes, Warsaw. 17 Hitler then forecast the incorporation into the Reich of the Soviet Baltic republics, the Crimea, Galicia, the Kola Peninsula, Baku and the region of Saratov, and the Polish Bialystok region. 18 The author does not know if all the plans mentioned have survived. The following plans are known to him: For the annexed Polish lands Himmler issued the Richtlinine für die Planung und Gestaltung der Städte in den eingegliederten deutschen Ostgebieten (Allgemeine Anordnung No. 13/II of 30. Jan. 1942) and Grundsätze und Richtlinien für denländlichen Aufbau in den neuen Ostgebieten (Neues Bauerntum - Sonderdruck, I/1941). In addition there was the Generalsiedlungsplan, mentioned by the chief of the SS and police in the Poznan region, SS-Gruppenführer Koppe (National Archives, Microcopy No T 81, roll No 296 k. 2421150-54). For Lorraine the governor, Bürckel, issued on 14. Oct. 1941 Grundsätze und Richtlinien für die ländliche Siedlungsplanung in Lothringen (Ibid, Microcopy No T 81, roll No 314, k. 2444383-244408). A Generalsiedlungsplan was also prepared for the annexed northern Slovenia (Lower Styria). The author does not know this general plan, but only the Anlage zu dem Generalsiedlungsplan der Grenzsiedlungszone der Untersteiermark of 11. Jan. 1942 and Entwurf zum Generalsiedlungsplan der Grenzsiedlungszone der Untersteiermark (Ibid, Microcopy No T 81, roll No 284 k. 2406980 and 2407023-55). The plans referring to Bohemia are to be found in the previously-mentioned publication Die Vergangenheit warnt. 19 XI Nuernberg Trial, No 2668. Note on speech 20 VIII Nuernberg Trial, No 2245, confidential letter of Himmler´s personal staff, sent direct to Meyer, as Greifelt had been given a long period of leave. 21 Ibid, confidential note. 22 VIII Nuernberg Trial, No 2255, confidential letter which came to Himmlers personal staff on Feburary 18th. It contradicts the evidence given by Meyer-Hetling in this trial on the cessation of this work in Janurary. 23 No 1/1960 24 This view is found in the VIII Nuernberg Trial, and also in Heiber´s introduction to the documentation on the GPO in the previously-mentioned "Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte". 25 Les Archives Secrètes du Comte Ciano 1936-42, p. 478 26 Buchheim, op. Cit. Pp. 250-251 27 National Archives, Microcopy No T 81, roll 291, Bericht über die sieben monatliche Tätigkeit vom 1. IV.-31. X. 42. Considerably more Volksdeutsche returned to Lithuania than were previously settled there, viz. 28,000. 28 Frank´s Tagebuch, 1941, I, 146-149 and Frank´s Regierungssitzungen 1941. III-X, 4-7 29 A description of these deportations is contained in C. Madajczyk´s article Deportations in the Zamossc Region in 1942 and 1943 in the Light of German Documents, "Acta Poloniae Historica", vol. I, Warszawa 1958. 30 At the beginning of 1942, Hitler had decided to start deporting Russians and Ukrainians from the Crimea and to settle 31 H. Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-42
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